The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: EventID=104573

It has been explained to them multiple times in congressional hearings. If you have a long time, the recent House Judiciary Committee Hearing is worth the watch: The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy ▶ this video There was another one that I watched back in June, but I cannot find the video at the moment. Should have bookmarked it! In the rietta.com article, I linked the this hearing, starting with Susan Landau's testimony starting at ▶ this video . But there is more must watch portions of the hearing. I like GnuPG and I use it regularly with work as does my team. And some of our clients do too, but not nearly enough. But my mom and dad are never going to use it. They do both use iPhones though. So being able to protect them is important.

Susan Landau's congressional testimony - with Comey siting one table away - applies to this as well. She explains in detail not only the problem with backdoors, but also how the FBI badly needs to update their methods. The quote from the NSA that legal access doesn't mean that access will be easy should have ended this brouhaha last year. ▶ this video

I sat through the YouTube presentation (which is available at ▶ this video if you have four hours to spare). In general the discussions were quite well presented, apart from a couple of rabid questioners suggesting that public security trumped any one individuals' right to personal security. I've written up a summary of the hearings at InfoQ here: link The general responses from Apple were that it wouldn't be possible to write this just for one phone; that once the FBiOS was available for one it would be available for any phone. Dr Landon also highlighted the fact that most people now use their phones as part of a two-factor authentication, and that the easiest way to break into a system (such as the IRS leak) is to compromise login credentials. The fear is, therefore, that once pandora's box is opened that the operating system would be installable on any device and thus potentially give access to any state actor to any account simply through device compromise. The entire hearing was very well laid out, though in a few cases Apple's witnesses weren't quite as fluid as the FBI's. The congress members have five days to ask additional questions, after which presumably a report will be made. More information is available at the House page here: link

> that doesn't lead to a wack-a-mole game Stored-program general purpose computers are a fundamentally a threat to any entrenched power that relies on being able to control any potential risk with physical, legal, economic, or social force. The only real way to control software that is no longer scarce is to find a way to hobble the "universal computing machine" so it is no longer universal. Cory Doctorow's warning[1] about the War On General Purpose Computing received a lot of attention, but I suspect his far more important followup[2] about the looming Civil War over General Purpose Computing was had a much smaller audience. Dan Geer suggested[3] that this "Cold Civil War" has been ongoing for a long time already. With this new push by FVEY nations against crypto, it looks like the war is starting to heat up. > where comms do go dark That's just not true. Metadata is everywhere and will likely only get even more informative into the future. As Susan Landau explained[4] in her testimony to Congress, the only people "going dark" are the people trying to "preserve 20th century investigative techniques [while] our enemies are using 21st century technologies against us." Complaining about "going dark" is just misdirection away from a total failure to update investigative techniques to not just keep up with changing technology, but to take advantage of the new opportunities created by our growing sea of {,meta}data. [1] link [2] link [3] link [4] ▶ this video

Encryption vs safety? This is carefully framed in a way that ignores the safety provided by proper encryption. This isn't "encryption vs safety", but actual safety of secure communication and personal data vs possible safety of solving a few more criminal cases. As koenigdavidmj already mentioned, one of the key principles of a free society is that liberty and justice is more important than law enforcement convenience. It is better to let the guilty go free than infringing the rights of the innocent. The police will simply have to be more creative and find alternative ways to do their work. Of course, the FBI and congress already knows this, as Susan Landau already explained this in her testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. ▶ this video

Many have noted this isn't about security vs. privacy. It's about security vs. security [1] [2] [3] Also, I think there's something different about getting access to someone's digital communications that makes digital data different from data previously obtained by warrants. Digital databases increasingly contain the entire history of people's communications. That's never been true before and it warrants additional discussion at the very least. The other argument against this bill is it is unenforceable. Terrorists won't be using the government-mandated encryption tools. They'll create their own. This is an opportunity for technologists to step up and take a larger role within government by educating representatives and the public, starting campaigns or non-profits, or perhaps running for office. [1] ▶ this video [2] ▶ this video [3] ▶ this video

This presents a summary of the congressional hearing "The Encryption Tightrope – Balancing American's Security and Privacy" that was covered live on YouTube ▶ this video A replay of the event is now available but the news piece summarises the important parts of the discussion.

Lots of interesting stuff in this session. "We are a rule-of-law country. The FBI is not cracking into your phone or listening to your communications except under the rule of law," says Comey (1:37). I suppose that's the NSA's job... ▶ this video

I'd love to see a transcript [2], or list of participants [4] and find out which representatives present lean towards Apple or towards the FBI. I skipped around the video. I mostly saw support for Apple, with a few exceptions, one being Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Sensenbrenner, a House republican of Wisconsin, asked Apple what legislation they would support, and Mr. Sewell, Apple's general counsel, said they support debate on the subject [1] The congressman was clearly bullying Mr. Sewell here and using his position as congressman to make it appear as though Apple is not being agreeable. Well, encouraging debate before writing one-sided legislation sounds like great teamwork to me. The congressman should have been reminded that not supporting new legislation is a valid position, and that every problem we face need not be solved with new laws. Perhaps Mr. Sewell is trying to be respectful to the congressman. But I think he should not shy from responding in kind. Treat others as they treat you. No one will judge you for it. I think Apple missed an opportunity here to say they do not feel new legislation is needed, since guaranteeing back doors into devices would be an abridgement of consumers' right to privacy, and Apple's right to create safe products for consumers as it sees fit. Overall though this seemed like a productive session. Mr. Gowdy, a House republican of South Carolina, also bullies Sewell in the same manner [3], literally asking Apple to lobby for legislation. In othe

I watched most of the hearing (can be viewed here ▶ this video ), this article seems like a pretty accurate characterization. Comey's parsing of words in his response to the question of whether any gov't agency can access the phone reminded me of Clapper's "least untruthful" answer (ie his lie about NSA data collection).

> The debate is shifting to "public security vs privacy" instead of Apple vs FBI, which is how a lot of the consumers and Apple fans see this right now Actually Apple is painting it as a "security vs. security" debate [1] [2]. They point out that every iPhone user's security is put at risk if they are forced to sign software that weakens the iPhone's security. > I rather enjoyed hearing Comey's responses and found Bruce Sewell to lack the same maturity and preparedness I thought Sewell performed well. He was given some tough questions he could not have anticipated. Sewell was the one on the hot seat here. Comey did not face as much pressure. [1] ▶ this video [2] ▶ this video

That is FBI director Comey's statement, not Apple's. Comey says, Apple is highly professional in protecting its own innovation, its own information [1] Comey even articulates Apple's position clearly, Apple's argument, I think will be, that's not reasonable because there are risks around that. Even though we're good at this, it could still get away from us. And the judge will have to figure that out [1] So Comey claims Apple is very good at technical stuff and so they must have a way to keep this software secure. Yet at the same time he claims we should not believe Apple when Apple says this backdoor would weaken everyone's security. On one hand he is saying we should believe in Apple's technology expertise, and on the other hand he is saying we should not. Well, given that Comey is self-admittedly not knowledgeable about technology, and given that many other tech companies and independent tech experts have stood up to support Apple, it's clear to me who to trust on this issue about tech security. Apple has demonstrated their commitment to safety by improving the iPhone's security with successive iterations of software and hardware. The FBI has demonstrated their deep desire to gain guaranteed backdoor entry to devices for over a year, yet claim this case is only about one phone. Apple's track record and rhetoric are much more consistent and trustworthy than the FBI's. [1] ▶ this video